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REFORMING U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN ERA
OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: THE LOGIC
INHERENT IN ACCOMMODATING THE INEVITABLE *
I. INTRODUCTION
For over one hundred years, the Statue of Liberty has served as
one of the United States's primary representative symbols, em-
bodying the welcoming spirit of equal opportunity on which the
country was founded.' The United States is, undeniably, an eclec-
tic "nation of immigrants."2 Nevertheless, despite the common
immigrant background virtually all Americans share,3 the admis-
sibility of immigrants has long been a thorny issue in American
society.4 Somewhat ironically, during the very years in which the
Statue of Liberty was erected to symbolize the nation as being
open to the "huddled masses yearning to be free,"5 immigrants
* This Comment was the first-place winner of the 2005 McNeill Writing Competition
sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See Rex D. Khan, Note, The Variable Up-Front Per Capita Visa Tax: A Contrac-
tual Approach to Immigration Law, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 409, 410 (1999) ("When we think
about the U.S. immigration policy, we normally think of a generous open-door policy.").
2. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF NEW AMERICANS 3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999); Khan, supra note 1, at
410; John S. Richbourg, Liberty and Security: The Yin and Yang of Immigration Law, 33
U. MEM. L. REV. 475, 477 (2003) (noting that even Native Americans can at least be con-
sidered descendants of immigrants, referring to Siberian immigrants who came to North
America 18,000 years ago over a land bridge temporarily formed after the last ice age).
3. This assertion should be taken to include Americans who were themselves immi-
grants and Americans whose ancestors were immigrants. Admittedly, some immigrants
came to this country against their will, as in the case of slaves involuntarily "imported"
from Africa, but most came by choice. FISS, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the origins of anti-immigrant sentiment in the
United States).
5. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the American Jewish Historical Society, Waltham, Massachusetts). Ms. Lazarus's famous
sonnet, from which these words were taken, is inscribed at the base of the Statue of Lib-
erty and has long been associated with immigration policy in the United States. See
Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth Amend-
ment be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to Ameri-
can Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (1995). But see Hon.
John F. Gossart, Jr., Lady Liberty Blows Out Her Torch: New Immigration Law is Unfor-
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"were engendering fear and dislike" among many segments of the
American population, inducing the federal government to begin
passing restrictive immigration legislation in the late 1800s.6
Since then, immigration policy in the United States has varied
according to economic needs, ethnic and religious biases, national
security concerns, foreign policy objectives, and general public
opinion and feelings toward "outsiders."7 Contributing to the ca-
pricious nature of immigration policy is the way in which immi-
gration law is set.' The United States Constitution expressly
enumerates several powers Congress can use to establish and
regulate immigration laws.9 Additionally, Congress has long been
recognized, under the plenary power doctrine, as implicitly hav-
ing "virtually unfettered discretion to [admit or] exclude immi-
grants" in any manner it deems appropriate at a given time.1" Be-
ginning in the years after World War II, the executive branch
giving and Far More Restrictive, 27 U. BALT. L.F. 25, 25 (1997) ("Yet these words inscribed
on Lady Liberty are no longer particularly true today and clearly have not been the rally-
ing call in the last decade.").
6. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, at xxxi-xxxii (Michael LeMay & Elliott Robert Barkan eds., 1999) [hereinafter
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION].
7. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1984).
8. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.5.4, at
746 (2d ed. 2002) ("The [Supreme] Court's repeated insistence that Congress has plenary
power to act against aliens in any way it wants must be seen as an invitation to Congress
to act capriciously.... .") (quoting Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Dis-
criminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 338 (1997)).
9. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 10-13
(3d ed. 2002); see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress may "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "[tlo establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power
"[t]o declare War," which suggests that Congress can regulate alien enemies when the
United States is at war); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (stating, "[tihe Migration or Importation of
such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight,"
which implies that Congress may prohibit migration and importation after 1808).
10. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 197 (2003); see, e.g.,
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 9.5.4, at 745-46; Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and
Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 384 (2004) (explaining that, under one common
conception, "Congress's power over immigration is simply unlimited by any constitutional
constraints"). For a glimpse into how the Supreme Court has historically interpreted Con-
gress's plenary power to regulate immigration to be virtually absolute, see infra note 66
and accompanying text. But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (pointing out
that Congress's plenary power does have certain constitutional limitations); Cox, supra, at
386 (arguing that modern courts put much less emphasis on the "absolute" nature of Con-
gress's plenary power to control immigration).
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began to take a more active role in crafting immigration policy,
sharing with Congress the plenary power to set immigration poli-
cies with almost complete immunity from judicial review. 1
The practical result of immigration law-making procedure has
been an enormous amount of legislation-rivaled in volume and
complexity only by the United States Tax Code' 2-that is modi-
fied by each Congress and every president to adapt and respond
to evolving social and economic trends. 3 Over the past four dec-
ades, one trend in particular has put a stranglehold on United
States immigration policy: the emergence of the Latin American
immigrant."'
Despite the precise statutory and regulatory framework of im-
migration law," an alarmingly increasing rate of illegal immigra-
tion from Latin America-predominantly from Mexico-has re-
newed a push in the United States for major immigration reform
over the past few years.'6 The issue has become one of the most
hotly debated and polarizing political topics in recent years,'
7
with immigration opponents frequently citing the $24 billion-
burden illegal aliens place on the United States economy annu-
11. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxv; see also Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (recognizing the presidential plenary
power by explaining that policies toward aliens or relating to foreign affairs "are so exclu-
sively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from ju-
dicial inquiry or interference").
12. E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY:
1798-1965, at xiii (1981).
13. See id. at 3 ("Our national immigration policy as formulated in law is thus the
product of long growth and development over a period of more than a century and a half,
in an ongoing process that may be expected to continue.").
14. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER:
ECONOMY SLOWED, BUT IMMIGRATION DIDN'T-THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, 2000-
2004, at 13-14 (Nov. 2004), at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004Ibackl204.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter CIS BACKGROUNDER] (noting that Mexico has been the top im-
migrant-sending country consistently since 1980, with Mexicans comprising sixteen per-
cent of the foreign-born in the United States in 1980, twenty-two percent in 1990, twenty-
eight percent in 2000, and thirty-one percent in 2004). The term "Latin America" refers to
all Central and South American countries, as well as any Spanish-speaking countries lo-
cated near the contiguous United States. In the context of this paper, "Latin American"
will usually refer to Mexicans specifically.
15. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 9 ("In minute detail, [the current Immigration and
Nationality Act] specifies which noncitizens may enter the United States and which of
those already here may stay.").
16. See infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
17. See Edwidge Danticat, Foreword to FISS, supra note 2, at ix ("In recent years, im-
migration has become one of the most heavily debated issues in the United States.").
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ally,'" and proponents pointing to the vast economic benefits im-
migrants provide.' 9 Within the United States, the rapidly expand-
ing minority base of Latin American voters has forced both De-
mocrats and Republicans to weigh immigration reform more
seriously.2 ° External factors have also played a significant role in
spawning reform initiatives, with one of the most influential fac-
tors being the repeated lobbying efforts by Mexican government
officials, whose economy's third largest revenue source in 2003
was money their citizens working in the United States sent back
home.2'
Not surprisingly, at the onset of the 2004 presidential cam-
paign season, President Bush introduced a major new immigra-
tion reform initiative.22 Having worked tirelessly throughout
much of his first term to keep the door to the United States closed
to terrorists, 23 President Bush, somewhat paradoxically, an-
nounced in January 2004 a proposal that would keep the door
open for millions of currently undocumented Latin American im-
migrants. In the months following the election, President Bush
has made clear that his guest-worker proposal was not simply
election-time rhetoric by continuing to lobby Congress to approve
a system that would dramatically change the face of United
States immigration law and policy toward Latin Americans.24
18. David M. Turoff, Note, Illegal Aliens: Can Monetary Damages Be Recovered from
Countries of Origin Under an Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 28
BROOK. J. INTL L. 179, 184 (2002).
19. See, e.g., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AILA BACKGROUNDER:
MYTHS AND FACTS IN THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 3 (Aug. 2003), at
http://aila.org/fileViewer.aspx? docID=10960 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter AILA
BACKGROUNDER] ("[Immigrants] may add as much as $10 billion to the [U.S.] economy
each year.").
20. See, e.g., John Moreno Gonzales, The Hispanic Vote; Candidates Yet to Excite Elec-
torate, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 2004, at A04 (citing, among other examples, an unprecedented
number of Republican- and Democrat-produced Spanish-language television spots as evi-
dence of both political parties' attention to the "crucial Hispanic swing vote"); infra Part
III.A.
21. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20,
2004, at 53; see infra Part III.D.1.
22. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Dueling Immigration Ideas Frame a Key Election Is-
sue; Democrats Counter Bush's Guest-Worker Concept with a Move Toward Citizenship,
L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at Al.
23. Although terrorism and immigration legislation overlap considerably, this Com-
ment will focus primarily on legislation and policy related to Latin American immigration
and employment. For a brief discussion of the Bush Administration's antiterrorism legis-
lation, see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
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This Comment analyzes the recent push for immigration re-
form, examining the many controversies, factors, and interests
involved in the modern immigration debate. Part II, in an effort
to frame the topic within a broader context, details the four major
historical periods of immigration law and policy in the United
States, paying particularly close attention to significant legisla-
tive acts, public sentiment, and domestic economics. Part III dis-
cusses the emergence of Latin American immigration as an in-
credibly divisive societal issue that strongly influenced both pre-
and post-election politics in 2004 and promises to be a major
theme of the 109th Session of Congress. Part IV considers the ap-
parent inevitability of increased Latin American immigration,
points out the impracticality of the Bush Administration's guest-
worker plan, and proposes several reality-based options for immi-
gration reform. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion advocat-
ing the acceptance and accommodation of Latin American immi-
gration.
II. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of immigration law in the United States can be
categorized into four distinct periods by examining trends in leg-
islative action, apparent societal concerns and attitudes, and
demographic shifts.25 The evolving nature of immigration law and
policy has reflected changes in "more fundamental social and
ideological structures"26 that have taken place over the past two
centuries, as the United States's international identity has
shifted from that of a fledgling country to a global economic pow-
erhouse. Although this Part offers a general history of immigra-
tion policy in the United States, special emphasis is placed on the
gradual introduction of Latin American workers to the United
States's economy and how their arrival triggered a phenomenon
that has shaped modern immigration debate.
25. See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 1-311.
While this Comment attempts to highlight the most significant political, social, and legal
developments affecting immigration policy, the discussion contained herein is by no means
a comprehensive analysis of all important immigration factors and laws. For an excellent
and thorough discussion of immigration issues and developments over the past two centu-
ries, see generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 12.
26. Schuck, supra note 7, at 2.
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A. The Era of Wide-Open Doors: The Colonial Period Through the
Late 1800s
Shortly after its birth as a nation, the United States recognized
immigration as imperative for the growth and prosperity of the
country.27 Immigration was viewed early on as a vital means of
"populating a vast unsettled continent and exploiting its un-
tapped wealth."28 Indeed, many of the country's earliest and most
influential political leaders stressed the importance of embracing
and encouraging immigration as a way to ensure industrial de-
velopment and to reinforce the United States's image as a gate-
way to newfound liberties, rights, and privileges.29 It was common
for both government officials and private employers to encourage
immigration to the point of actively recruiting potential immi-
grants by offering enticing incentives, and sometimes by advertis-
ing. °
The practical result of governmental and industrial enthusiasm
for immigration in this first historical period was a country with
27. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxix-xxx (ex-
plaining the need for immigrants to help build cities, clear the frontier land for farms,
strengthen the nation's ability to ward off Indian attacks, and avoid coming under the con-
trol of European colonial powers).
28. Schuck, supra note 7, at 2; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra
note 6, at xxix-xxx; Hon. Paul Brickner & Meghan Hanson, The American Dreamers: Ra-
cial Prejudices and Discrimination as Seen Through the History of American Immigration
Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 205 (2004) ("America was so huge, underdeveloped,
and sparsely populated that the nation welcomed immigrants who could help unfold the
country's rapidly expanding territory.").
29. See, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR:
1820-1924, at 1 (1984) (referring to Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Report on Manufacturing
that warned Congress of the need for immigrants to compensate for the "scarcity of hands"
and the "dearness of labor"); Letter from General George Washington to Volunteer Asso-
ciation of the Kingdom of Ireland Lately Arrived in the City of New York (Dec. 2, 1783), in
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 10 ("The bosom of America is
open to receive ... the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions; whom we
shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges, if by decency and propri-
ety of conduct they appear to merit the enjoyment.").
30. See CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 1. One such incentive was found in a federal act
granting expedited naturalization rights to alien-soldiers who had been honorably dis-
charged from the "armies of the United States" upon their petition showing at least one
year's residence within the United States prior to filing the petition. Act of July 17, 1862,
ch. 200, § 21, 12 Stat. 597 (revised and codified as The Alien Soldiers Naturalization Act,
Rev. Stat. § 2166 (1878)). Advertising and inducements to potential immigrants also com-
monly took place abroad, as all American consuls in Northern Europe actively encouraged
emigration to the United States, and American employers often placed advertisements in
foreign newspapers. CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 41, 45.
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virtually no federal regulation of immigration until the late nine-
teenth century.31 Some scholars have gone as far as to label the
United States from the late eighteenth until the late nineteenth
century as an "open border country with no immigration laws. 32
To be completely accurate, although there was little federal im-
migration regulation until the late nineteenth century,33 many
states passed immigration legislation in primarily five major
categories:
[1] regulation of the migration of convicts; [21 regulation of persons
likely to become or actually becoming a public charge; [3] prevention
of the spread of contagious diseases, including maritime quarantine
and suspension of communication by land; [4] regionally varying
policies relating to slavery, including the prohibition of the slave
trade; and [51 bans on the migration of free blacks, including the sea-
men's acts.
34
Some of these state statutes, however, were declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States for invading the
federal government's power to regulate foreign commerce.3
All factors considered, the United States pursued a relatively
barrier-free immigration policy grounded in "laissez-fair values of
unimpeded resource flow and exchange" from the colonial period
until the late nineteenth century.3s Even when the wave of Catho-
lic immigrants in the 1830s and 1840s "set off a dramatic anti-
31. See, e.g., Brickner & Hanson, supra note 28, at 205; Schuck, supra note 7, at 2, 5;
Turoff, supra note 18, at 181.
32. Michael Maggio et al., Immigration Fundamentals for International Lawyers, 13
AM. U. INTL L. REV. 857, 862 (1998); see also Schuck, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that the
United States, during this period, had "a policy of essentially open borders"). But see
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-20 (1996) (dismissing the "open border" argument as a "myth" per-
meating legal discussions of immigration regulation).
33. One of the few sets of federal legislative actions that restricted immigration in this
first historical period does warrant consideration. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798
"gave the President the power to expel suspect foreigners by executive decree," but were
only in force for two years. See Turoff, supra note 18, at 181 n.22.
34. NEUMAN, supra note 32, at 41-42.
35. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 125. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, §
5.2.3, at 291-97 (discussing the topic of federal preemption of state immigration laws and
citing several cases that affirmed the federal government's power to invalidate state laws
having direct or indirect effects on foreign policy or immigration).
36. Schuck, supra note 7, at 7; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra
note 6, at xxix-xxx ("The sentiment prevailing among most U.S. citizens at the time was
that the nation was a brave and bold experiment in freedom which they felt should be
shared by any and all who desired to be free, regardless of their former nationality.").
20051
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
foreign reaction" among many Americans, the dire need for immi-
grant labor prevailed in determining immigration law and pol-
icy.37 This need intensified during and immediately after the Civil
War, as war-time manufacturing and post-war transcontinental
railroad construction increased the demand for labor.3 It was not
until the economic depression of the 1870s that antiimmigration
sentiment began to influence legislation. 9
B. Exclusionary Impulses Take Root: The Late 1800s Through
1920
1. Increasing Resentment Toward Immigrants
Between roughly the last quarter of the nineteenth century and
1920, over "23.5 million immigrants flooded into the United
States, predominantly from South, Central, and Eastern Europe
and from Asia"4 -a significant change from the traditional
Northern and Western European nationalities of America's early
immigrants.' These "new" immigrants' characteristics--coloring,
physique, cultures, religions, and languages-differed greatly
from the mold to which most Americans had grown accustomed.4
Many Americans were skeptical of the new immigrants' abilities
to properly assimilate into American society. Furthermore,
claims that the new immigrants "were racially inferior and more
likely to become criminals or diseased" were given merit in scien-
tific and sociological books and articles." As a result of these
common fears and complaints, a sense of xenophobia began to
build in American cities.45
37. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxx-xxxi.
38. Id. at xxxi.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Schuck, supra note 7, at 5 (describing the "dramatic" ethnic and cultural
changes in the immigrant population between the 1870s and World War I, and outlining
the geographic contrast between the "old" and "new" immigrants).
42. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxi-xxxii.
43. Id. at xxxii.
44. Id.; see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 83 (discussing the undesirability of
new immigrants and the "suspicion that other nations were dumping their least-wanted
citizens in the United States").
45. See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for
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By 1880, "more than 70% of the populations in each of Amer-
ica's largest cities were immigrants or children of immigrants,"
and, "foreign-born [workers] increasingly made up the bulk of the
industrial labor force."46 Spurred by governmental and industrial
encouragement of immigration during the greater part of the
nineteenth century, as well as the "temporary stimulus of war-
time manpower shortages,"47 the influx of new immigrants pro-
duced a surplus of cheap, albeit unskilled, labor that created a
new problem: job displacement.4" As industrial mechanization
improved in the United States, employers started "displac[ing]
unionized labor with the thousands of unskilled, nonunionized
immigrants that entered the country each month."49 Widespread
fear among Americans that their jobs were being threatened by
immigrants became a grievance frequently voiced in union news-
papers ° that would also prove to be a theme strongly echoed in
the future.5'
2. Restrictive Immigration Legislation Begins
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, an increase in hos-
tility and resentment toward new immigrants, based largely on
xenophobic attitudes and employment concerns, served as a cata-
lyst for the enactment of new restrictive federal immigration
laws. The first official federal legislative act restricting immigra-
tion during this second historical period was passed in 1875.52
The Immigration Act of 1875 was designed primarily to prohibit
the immigration and importation of Chinese prostitutes and
European criminals-two classes of individuals causing increas-
the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 176 n.361 (1994) (arguing that a sense of na-
tivism among 'WASP Americans" made them "virulently xenophobic"); Schuck, supra note
7, at 3 (listing "nativist xenophobia" as one of the exclusionary impulses leading to the en-
actment of restrictive federal immigration legislation).
46. CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 41.
47. HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 83.
48. See CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 39-40.
49. Id. Union representatives considered "labor-saving machines" to actually be
"wage-saving and labor-displacing machines." Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
50. See id. at 50.
51. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
52. Immigration Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78 (repealed
1974).
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ing concern and moral indignation among many Americans.5 3 De-
spite its relatively narrow scope, the Immigration Act of 1875
"began an extension of federal authority" and a pattern of exclu-
sion that would "develop into a major instrument of [federal] im-
migration policy."
5 4
In 1882, President Chester A. Arthur approved two major re-
strictive immigration bills: the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882"5
and the Immigration Act of August 3, 1882.6 The Chinese Exclu-
sion Act was enacted in response to mounting paranoia and anger
over an enormous increase in the number of Chinese immigrants,
particularly in California.5 7 Many of the Chinese immigrants
were contract workers drawn to the West Coast for temporary
work as gold miners or railroad builders. 5' These so-called "so-
journers," with no intent to permanently reside in the United
States, often had little incentive to learn English or conform to
American customs-a source of annoyance to American workers.59
Moreover, Chinese immigrants were typically frugal and unac-
companied by families, so they were content working for lower
wages than most American workers were willing to accept. 60 Per-
turbed by the foreign-born competition undercutting their own
wages, American workers experienced "deep and bitter" irrita-
tion, which resulted in public conflicts and persistent petitioning
for restrictive legislation.61
Congressional proponents of the Chinese Exclusion Act made
clear that, in passing the legislation, labor concerns were taken
53. HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 66; see U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
supra note 6, at xxxi.
54. HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 66; see also Schuck, supra note 7, at 2-3 (detailing
the development of "exclusionary impulses" during the 1880s).
55. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
56. Immigration Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1974).
57. See Brickner & Hanson, supra note 28, at 219 (noting that, because of differences
in "religion, language, and physical appearance," prejudice against Chinese workers inten-
sified, resulting in the break-out of"violent anti-Chinese riots on the West Coast").
58. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 594 (1889).
59. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxii; see also Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595 ("[Chinese immigrants] remained strangers in the
land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living.").
60. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595.
61. Id.
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into account but were not "paramount."62 Instead, in the legisla-
tors' view, what made Chinese immigration most undesirable was
the social, moral, political, and religious inability of the Chinese
people to assimilate into American society.63 Some remarks made
during floor debates prior to the Act's enactment advocated what,
under contemporary societal norms, would be considered disturb-
ing racial and religious ideals for the United States's expanding
population base.64 Once enacted, the Act's main effects barred the
entry of Chinese immigrants for a period of ten years and author-
ized "the deportation of 'any Chinese person found unlawfully
within the United States."'65 In an early affirmation of Congress's
broad discretion and authority to admit or exclude immigrants as
it saw fit within the bounds of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Wong Wing v.
United States.66
Enacted less than three months after the Chinese Exclusion
Act, the Immigration Act of 1882 (the "1882 Act") expanded the
excludable classes of immigrants from the two categories desig-
62. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Con-
stitutional Law ofImmigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1998).
63. Id. at 30.
64. See, e.g., id. (citing 13 CONG. REC. 2035 (1882) (statement of Rep. Berry) (predict-
ing that "the light of Christianity [would] be obscured in the gloom of heathen darkness" if
Chinese immigrants were ever granted citizenship)); id. at 31 (citing 13 CONG. REC. 1645
(1882) (statement of Sen. Teller) ("[Tihe Caucasian race has a right, considering its supe-
riority of intellectual force and mental vigor, to look down upon every other branch of the
human family .... We are the superior race today. We are superior to the Chinese .... )).
See generally id. at 28-36 (highlighting the blatantly racist and ethnocentric attitudes of
many congressmen supporting the Chinese Exclusion Act and analogizing the prejudices
against the Chinese to the prejudices against African-Americans).
65. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 82.
66. 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896). The Court stated that Congress should be unlimited in
its power "to protect.., the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render
them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our
land and unlawfully remain therein." Id. at 237. The Court's holding in Wong Wing rein-
forced the stance it had adopted seven years prior in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
at 609; see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (explaining American feelings
toward Chinese immigrants in the late 1800s). In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court
held:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belong-
ing to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign pow-
ers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when,
in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.
130 U.S. at 609.
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nated in the Immigration Act of 1875.67 The 1882 Act added the
additional excludable classes of "'lunatics, idiots, convicts, and
those liable to become public charges."'68 The 1882 Act also au-
thorized medical examinations in an effort to bar individuals suf-
fering from "'loathsome or contagious diseases"'69 from entering,
and it imposed a fifty-cent tax on every passenger on a vessel ar-
riving from a foreign port.7 ° Despite its broader reaching restric-
tions, however, the 1882 Act was not completely blind to the
rights and liberties of potential immigrants, as it distinguished
between crimes of moral turpitude and crimes of a political na-
ture, with individuals convicted of the latter type still being ad-
missible.71
By passing two major acts in 1882, Congress revealed its will-
ingness to embrace a federal regulatory system that would im-
pose and tailor immigration restrictions as necessary.72 Viewing
their concerns as being fairly well received in Congress, nativist
groups and labor unions lobbied for further restrictive legislation,
particularly in the form of literacy and English language tests as
necessary hurdles for immigrants to overcome to gain citizen-
ship. 3 Although a literacy bill was passed by both houses of Con-
gress in 1895 and similar bills were "almost continuously before
Congress," they were repeatedly defeated by presidential veto.74
The push for restriction continued into the twentieth century,
with Congress frequently passing bills aimed at restricting immi-
gration, many of which were enacted.7' The head tax, for example,
was increased to one dollar in 1894, only to be doubled to two dol-
67. HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 80. The two classes originally designated under
the 1875 Act were convicts and individuals immigrating to the United States for 'lewd or
immoral" purposes, the latter designation referring to Chinese prostitutes. Id.
68. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxii.
69. Id. at xxxii.
70. Id. at 55.
71. See id.
72. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 85. It should be noted that Congress revised
the Chinese Exclusion Act several times such that, by 1900, Chinese laborers and their
spouses were almost completely prohibited from immigrating to the United States. U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxii.
73. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiii.
74. HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 157; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiii.
75. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 157 ("[D]uring [this second historical period]
the call for restriction became more and more explicit. Petitions to Congress called for it,
and the term ['restriction'] came to be used more frequently by supporters of various meas-
ures in Congress.").
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lars in 1903, and then doubled again to four dollars in 1907.76
While a literacy requirement was not yet imposed, the 1906 en-
actment of a law requiring that immigrants be able to speak Eng-
lish in order to be considered for citizenship did help to appease
some restriction proponents.77
In 1907, Congress commissioned what became known as the
Dillingham Commission, named after its chairman, Senator Wil-
liam Dillingham, to study the subject of immigration. 8 In 1911,
the Dillingham Commission issued a forty-two volume report es-
pousing many of the Darwinism-based racist and ethnocentric ar-
guments made in support of the Chinese Exclusion Act. 79 Not
surprisingly, among the proposals was a literacy requirement for
immigrants that was finally adopted over President Woodrow
Wilson's veto in the Immigration Act of 1917 (the "1917 Act").80
One other very important provision of the 1917 Act established
an "Asiatic Barred Zone, which virtually excluded all Asian im-
migration."'"
With Asian immigration effectively banned and European im-
migration severely curtailed by World War I, the United States
turned to Mexico as a "'back-door"' source for temporary war-time
labor 82-a highly significant decision for both the purposes of this
Comment and for the future of immigration policy in the United
States.8 Driven by a need to supply increased manpower for
American industries and agricultural employers in the Southwest
after the United States entered World War I in 1917, Secretary of
Labor William Wilson exempted Mexican workers from the re-
cently increased head tax and the literacy requirement that had
only been in force for a few months .' Mexicans were allowed to
enter the United States as guest workers on a temporary basis,
six months at a time, which fulfilled the United States's dual
76. Id.
77. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiii.
78. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 39, 34 Stat. 898, 909.
79. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 47.
80. Id. at 48; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78. The 1917 Act
also doubled the head tax to eight dollars and added alcoholics, vagrants, and psychopaths
to the list of excluded classes. Id.
81. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 48.
82. CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 134-35 (explaining that American industries re-
cruited Mexicans "in unprecedented numbers" as temporary workers during World War I).
83. See infra Part III.
84. CALAVITA, supra note 29, at 135.
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goals of meeting American industries' war-time needs while keep-
ing the Mexicans "socially and politically marginal."
5
Despite having benefited greatly from foreign-born laborers-
mostly Mexicans-during World War I, the United States experi-
enced widely felt and incredibly strong nationalistic, antiforeign
sentiments by the end of the war in 1919.86 With xenophobia at
an all-time "high pitch," the stage was set for the third phase of
immigration law and policy to begin in the United States.8
C. The Era of Extreme Restriction: 1920 Through 1965
In the years immediately following World War I, several factors
contributed to the renewal of calls for more restrictive legislation.
As immigration numbers began to rise toward pre-war levels,
many Americans feared that citizens from war-devastated coun-
tries would soon inundate the United States. 8 The isolationist
mood of the post-war period and an economic depression influ-
enced legislators' desires to curb immigration.8 9 Additionally, in-
creased paranoia and skepticism of "un-American" political views,
as evidenced by the Red Scare and the Palmer Raids of 1919-
1920,90 impacted legislative initiatives to supplement the tradi-
tionally qualitative restrictions on immigration with quantitative
restrictions. 9'
Legislation in 1921 introduced, for the first time ever, quanti-
tative restrictions on immigration in the form of strict national-
origin-based quota limitations.92 The Quota Act of 1921, with cer-
tain exceptions, temporarily allocated quotas to each nationality
"totaling 3% of the foreign born persons of that nationality resid-
85. Id. at 137.
86. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 L. & HIST. REv. 69, 75 (2003).
87. See id.
88. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 126.
89. Id.
90. During the Red Scare in the winter of 1919-1920, authorities executed raids
(known as the Palmer Raids) aimed at suspected Eastern European revolutionaries and
communists. Brickner & Hanson, supra note 28, at 223-24. These raids resulted in the
arrests of "10,000 alleged anarchists" and the ultimate deportation of 500 of them. Ngai,
supra note 86, at 74.
91. See Ngai, supra note 86 at 74.
92. Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a)-(b), 42 Stat. 5; see LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 126.
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ing in the United States in 1910."13 A permanent and more re-
strictive quota policy was put in place in 1924, which essentially
fixed the quota for a particular nationality proportionate to the
number of persons of that nationality living in the United States
in 1920. 94 Not included in the quota policy were immigrants from
Western Hemisphere countries, whose entry was not numerically
limited.95 Nevertheless, between 1920 and 1965, the quota laws,
coupled with the immigration-reducing effects of the Great De-
pression, had a profound impact on immigration numbers.9 6 Dur-
ing that forty-five-year period, the total number of immigrants
entering the country was limited to fewer than six million-an
astounding drop when compared to the 23.5 million immigrants
who entered during the forty-year period between 1880 and
1920.9" The quota restrictions remained, for the most part, un-
changed for approximately thirty years.98
The harsh immigration restrictions were slightly modified in
the 1940s, however, due to a number of factors arising out of the
United States's participation in World War 11." Since China had
been a war-time ally, Congress repealed the long-standing ban on
Chinese immigration as a matter of foreign policy.100 Also, similar
to the practice in place during World War I, the concept of em-
ploying temporary Mexican "guest workers" was introduced yet
again to fill war-time needs."' Spurred by the "flight [of American
agricultural laborers] to higher-paying industrial jobs generated
by the war," the Bracero Program was instituted in 1942 at the
request of Southwestern agribusiness leaders.' 2 Under the agree-
93. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 126. The Quota Act of 1921 effectively allowed for the
admission of 350,000 quota immigrants annually. Id.
94. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153; see also LEGOMSKY, supra
note 9, at 126. The admission of quota immigrants was limited to approximately 150,000
per year. Id.
95. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 126.
96. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiv.
97. Id.
98. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 126-27.
99. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiv.
100. Act of December 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600; see U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiv.
101. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxiv-v;
Lorenzo A. Alvarado, Comment, A Lesson from My Grandfather, the Bracero, 22 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 55, 57-58 (2001); Nicole Jacoby, Note, America's De Facto Guest Workers:
Lessons from Germany's Gastarbeiter for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1569, 1573-74, 1574 n.18 (2004).
102. Alvarado, supra note 101, at 57.
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ment between the United States and Mexico, Mexican guest
workers ("Braceros") would be recruited only to areas with certi-
fied labor shortages, and their employment would be governed by
written labor contracts with specified terms of duration. 0 After
their contracts expired, Braceros were obligated to immediately
return to Mexico. °4 Although implemented to compensate for
war-time labor shortages, the Bracero Program was extended for
over two decades, and Braceros' employment contracts were fre-
quently renewed." 5
Along with the practice of importing Mexican Braceros, how-
ever, came the trend of deporting other classes of immigrants or
at least temporarily removing suspect classes. 10 6 Post-war fear of
Communism intensified in the United States and, reminiscent of
the Palmer Raids earlier in the century, the federal government
took actions to protect the American public from what was con-
sidered a threatening foreign voice of political dissent.107 The In-
ternal Security Act of 1950 made past or present membership in,
or affiliation with, the Communist Party a ground for exclusion or
deportation. 0
8
Further expanding the grounds for deportation and, perhaps,
the most significant legislative development of the era was the
enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the
"INA"),109 "an unprecedented recodification and revision of exist-
ing immigration law" that still constitutes the backbone for im-
migration law in the United States. 10 The INA broadened the cri-
103. Id. at 59-60.
104. Id. at 60.
105. Id. at 59. For a thorough discussion of the Bracero Program and the controversies
surrounding it, see generally id. at 57-73.
106. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the "evacuation" of Japanese-Americans to concentration camps out of concern
for national security and fear of disloyalty). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, §
9.3.3.1, at 670-72 (providing background and criticism of the Korematsu case); R. Spencer
Macdonald, Comment, Rational Profiling in America's Airports, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 113,
122-24 (2002) (outlining the many criticisms of Japanese internment during World War
II).
107. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 127; see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 256
("[Wars, like depressions, always have strong effects on attitudes toward immigration and
the alien.").
108. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006.
109. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
110. Kati L. Griffith, Comment, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private
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teria for exclusion and deportation, with most of the new grounds
relating to national security or political expression.'11 Another
major aspect of the INA was the addition of a "preferences" sys-
tem for certain skilled laborers and for relatives of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent resident aliens,"2 thereby establishing the
basis for the most common modern forms of lawful immigration.
In 1953, a special commission was formed to closely study im-
migration law and policy." 3 The commission ultimately recom-
mended a less restrictive, more liberal approach to immigration,
and several private bills were enacted in the 1950s in an effort to
clarify and loosen certain aspects of existing law."' Finally, in
1965, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965,5 which officially ended the strict national-origins quota
system and marked the beginning of the fourth and current phase
of immigration law and policy in the United States." 6
D. The Era of Latin American Immigration: 1965 Through the
Present
1. 1965-2000
When considering the current era of immigration law and pol-
icy, many scholars have been unable to assign a particular adjec-
tive or phrase that accurately characterizes the period. One com-
mon observation is that immigration legislation over the past
forty years has been facially neutral, lacking the overt tones of
restriction that dominated the first seventy-five years of federal
Immigration Bills and Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 273,
280 (2004); see LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 127.
111. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 399; Griffith, supra note 110, at 280. INA §
212(a)(27) "covered noncitizens believed to be entering the United States to engage in ac-
tivities 'prejudicial to the public interest."' Section 212(a)(28) pertained to noncitizens who
had ever advocated communism, anarchy, or the propriety of overthrowing government.
Section 212(a)(29) addressed noncitizens likely to engage in espionage, sabotage, or sub-
version. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 399.
112. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, §§ 203(a)(1)-(3), 66 Stat. 163.
113. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxvi.
114. See Griffith, supra note 110, at 282.
115. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)).
116. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at xxxvi.
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immigration lawmaking in the United States." 7 The most re-
sounding observation, however, is the emergence of illegal immi-
gration from Latin America as the chief consideration consuming
the executive and legislative immigration agendas.1 8 Preoccupa-
tion over the influx of illegal, undocumented Latin American
workers-mostly Mexican-during the current era has resulted
in a considerable amount of legislation, but very little success.11 9
After a relatively prosperous preceding decade, the 1970s
weighed the United States's economy down with significant "stag-
flation"--a combination of both high inflation and high unem-
ployment. 20 Also, as a result of the Bracero Program ending in
1964, the United States experienced a major increase in the num-
ber of illegal Mexican immigrants crossing the border. 2' These
two combined factors put pressure on Congress to again enact re-
strictive legislation.1 22 In response, Congress formed the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978 to closely
consider the problem of illegal immigration. 23 One of the Com-
mission's main recommendations-to impose sanctions on em-
ployers who knowingly hired illegal aliens-was incorporated into
the primary piece of immigration legislation arising out of the
1980s. 1
24
117. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 2, at 3 ("[Slince the 1960s our immigration laws have
been purged of an overt racial and ethnic bias."); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
supra note 6, at xxxvi (arguing that the current era of immigration law and policy has "re-
ject[edl the open racism of the quota system"); Brickner & Hanson, supra note 28, at 228-
29 ("[The] treaties and statutes [of the current era] have removed explicit discrimination
from American immigration law; they are facially neutral.").
118. See Kiera LoBreglio, Note, The Border Security and Immigration Improvement
Act: A Modern Solution to a Historic Problem?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 933, 933, 949 (2004)
(commenting on the "marked focus both in the political arena and in general public dis-
course on the problems caused by illegal immigration from Central and South America,
and in particular from Mexico").
119. See, e.g., id. at 958 ("By all accounts, contemporary United States immigration
policy has been ineffective in significantly reducing the flow of illegal migration from Mex-
ico."); JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from Reagan
Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 617 (2002) (arguing that a lack of
presidential leadership on immigration reform over the past couple of decades has re-
sulted in a failure to deter and prevent illegal entry into the United States).
120. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 252.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Turoff, supra note 18, at 183.
124. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 252-53.
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The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA")'25
attempted to curb illegal immigration in two main ways: (1) by
imposing sanctions on employers of undocumented workers, and
(2) by granting amnesty to special agricultural workers who could
prove they had been performing agricultural work in the United
States for at least ninety days between May 1985 and May 1986
without proper documentation. 12 6  Despite the "sweeping
changes"1 27 it introduced to immigration law, IRCA had a rela-
tively minor impact that did little to ameliorate the growing prob-
lem of illegal immigration.
128
Congress tried again in 1990 to combat the mounting illegal
entry statistics through the enactment of the Immigration Act of
1990 (the "1990 Act"), 129 which many commentators described as
being "unquestionably... the most important immigration stat-
ute in many years." 30 Oddly, the 1990 Act had only two provi-
sions relating specifically to illegal immigration, one of them be-
ing designed to make it easier to deport criminal aliens, and the
other being an effort to fortify the U.S.-Mexico border by increas-
ing the size of the Border Patrol.' The main effect of the 1990
Act was to make more visas available, which dramatically in-
creased the rate of legal immigration by thirty-five percent but
did virtually nothing to lower the levels of illegal immigration.'32
Shortly after the 1990 Act's ineffectiveness became apparent,
"public frustration with the mass immigration problem began to
boil over." '133 Public opinion, particularly in states strongly im-
125. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
126. See LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 949; Maggio, supra note 32, at 864-65. The am-
nesty program led to the legalization of nearly three million workers who had previously
been undocumented. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1623.
127. LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 131.
128. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 6, at 253 ("IRCA had but
a very temporary impact on the flow of immigrants ... ."); LoBreglio, supra note 118, at
949-50 (explaining that illegal immigration continued to rise throughout the late 1980s
and early 1990s, while "the rate of unemployment for domestic agricultural workers re-
mained high").
129. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
130. E.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 131.
131. See Spotts, supra note 119, at 612.
132. Id.; see LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 951.
133. Spotts, supra note 119, at 613; see also, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1623 ("By
the early 1990s, the tide had turned and public sentiment concerning immigrants grew
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pacted by illegal immigration, clearly indicated a desire for more
restrictions. 134 In 1993 and 1994, President Clinton approved and
launched several initiatives to strengthen the Border Patrol, none
of which was particularly effective.135 The centerpiece of President
Clinton's immigration efforts proved to be the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), passed in
1996.136 The IIRIRA provided several mechanisms designed to
thwart the entry of illegal immigrants, such as the hiring of one
thousand new Border Patrol agents annually, the imposition of
stricter penalties on smugglers of aliens, and the reinforcement
and construction of fencing on the border with Mexico. 137 Consis-
tent with the fate of other initiatives designed to combat illegal
immigration, however, the IIRIRA did little to reverse the un-
precedented increases in illegal immigration. 13 By the end of
President Clinton's second term, the illegal immigration problem
seemed to be growing exponentially with approximately six mil-
lion illegal immigrants living in the United States as of July
2000. 139
2. The Bush Administration
Just months into his first term, President Bush quickly made
immigration reform a priority, stressing his desire for a "re-
vamped" guest-worker program. 14 Working closely together,
increasingly negative.").
134. E.g., Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1625 ("Anti-immigrant sentiments were strongest
in the key immigrant-receiving states of California, Texas, and Florida."); Spotts, supra
note 119, at 613 (discussing grassroots immigration reform movements in California, Flor-
ida, New York, Texas, and Illinois with particular focus on California's highly influential
"Proposition 187"). For details on Proposition 187, see infra notes 169-70 and accompany-
ing text.
135. See Spotts, supra note 119, at 614-15 & n.116. (noting that, despite increases in
personnel and improvements in equipment and technology, over 400,000 immigrants were
still able to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally in 1996).
136. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
137. LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 952; Spotts, supra note 119, at 615.
138. See LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 952 ("[T]he IIRIRA, like so many other reforms
before it, failed to produce a dramatic downturn in illegal immigration."); Spotts, supra
note 119, at 617 (noting that "there had been little improvement made" during Clinton's
presidency when considering that the number of illegal aliens entering the United States
had increased at a rate of about 300,000 per year).
139. Spotts, supra note 119, at 617.
140. Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage
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President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox formed a bi-
national policy group consisting of the attorneys general and the
secretaries of state and labor from both countries."' The group
established several general principles that would serve the inter-
ests of both the United States and Mexico but did not agree upon
a specific legislative plan to put into action.4 In early September
2001, less than a week before the horrific terrorist attacks, a
U.S.-Mexican immigration reform plan seemed to be building
momentum in light of President Fox's first State Visit to the
White House. 43 After extensive talks, President Bush and Presi-
dent Fox endorsed a joint statement released on September 6,
2001, which provided, in relevant part:
[President Bush and President Fox] stressed their commitment...
to reach mutually satisfactory results on border safety, a temporary
worker program and the status of undocumented Mexicans in the
United States. They requested that the working group provide them
proposals with respect to these issues as soon as possible. The Presi-
dents recognized that.., it is critical to address the issue in a timely
manner and with appropriate thoroughness and depth.
144
The two Presidents' emphasis that time was of the essence in
pursuing immigration reform suggested that the United States
and Mexico were on the brink of a historic bilateral immigration
agreement.145 That prospect was at least temporarily shattered,
however, as the devastating terrorist attacks immediately shifted
the United States government's attention from immigration re-
form to more urgent national security matters.141
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 866-67 (2003); see also Jacoby, supra note 101, at
1635; LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 941.
141. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1635.
142. Id. at 1635 n.357 (explaining that the principles agreed upon were that a reformed
immigration policy should "match willing workers with willing employees, serve the social
and economic needs of both countries, . . . respect the human dignity of all immigrants
regardless of their legal status in the United States [,]" and ensure that immigration would
occur through safe and legal channels).
143. See id. at 1635.
144. Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, White House Press Release, Sept. 6, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-8.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (emphasis added).
145. Johnson, supra note 140, at 867 ("Although difficult issues remained to be solved,
compromise appeared possible.").
146. See id. at 867 ("After September 11, discussions virtually stopped in their tracks.
A U.S./Mexico migration agreement restructuring migration between the United States
and Mexico was apparently another casualty of the catastrophic events of that day."); Lo-
Breglio, supra note 118, at 942 ("Immediately after the terrorist attacks, however, the
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In the two years following the terrorist attacks, President Fox
attempted to reinitiate reform talks several times to no avail.147
The executive and legislative branches of the United States gov-
ernment were understandably preoccupied with the global war on
terror.14 Although Congress passed several significant pieces of
legislation affecting immigration during those two years, the
changes were terrorism-themed, and not the employment-themed
adjustments that seemed likely to come to fruition in the first
week of September 2001.19 In January 2004, however, immigra-
tion reform aimed at Latin America was once again put at the
forefront of American politics and public debate.1"'
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: PRE- AND
POST-ELECTION IMMIGRATION DEBATE
Over the past few years, the impact of Latin American immi-
gration on the United States population has been astounding.
The immigrant population-legal and illegal-in the United
States reached a record of more than thirty-four million in March
talks ended, and the focus shifted from relaxing border controls to heightening them."); see
also Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1642-45 (observing that September 11 marked the begin-
ning of a more than two-year hiatus for the Bush Administration's immigration reform
agenda).
147. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1643.
148. Id. Several major pieces of legislation, including the expansive USA Patriot Act,
were passed shortly after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. A detailed analysis of terror-
ism and national security initiatives affecting immigration, however, would be outside the
scope of this paper. For thorough discussions of post-9/11 terrorism legislation affecting
immigration, see generally Johnson, supra note 140 (focusing on the concrete effects of
September 11 on United States immigration law) and Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legisla-
tion Pursuant to Threats to U.S. National Security, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 83 (2003).
149. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 855-60 (discussing the USA Patriot Act, increased
visa monitoring, and stricter immigration enforcement-all of which affect Latin Ameri-
can immigrants and their employment prospects-that resulted after the terrorist at-
tacks); see also LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 942 ("[I]t is inevitable that [Mexicans] will be
the group most affected by [post-9/11 legislation], regardless of whether the proposals are
aimed specifically at the Mexican community.").
150. See President George W. Bush, Remarks on New Temporary Worker Program
Proposal Presented in the East Room of the White House (Jan. 7, 2004) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/O1/print/20040107-3.html) (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Bush Remarks] (discussing the temporary worker program
in the contexts of national security, economic benefit, and immigration reform); see also
Sara R. Bollerup, Comment, America's Scapegoats: The Undocumented Worker and Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1009, 1045-46 (2004) (discussing the recent political emphasis on immigration reform).
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2004, an increase of well over four million since 2000.15' Nearly
one-third of all immigrants living in the United States are Mexi-
can, and in 2004 alone, Mexico sent over five times more immi-
grants than any other single country. 5 2 Finally, an estimated
three million illegal aliens entered the United States in 2004-
three times the number of immigrants entering legally-and the
vast majority of those immigrants came from Mexico.153 With
Latin Americans dramatically changing the demographic land-
scape of many key electoral states, their importance as an atten-
tion-meriting constituency was quite clear throughout the 2004
presidential campaign. 15 4 President Bush's announcement in
early 2004 that his Administration was revisiting and tweaking
its guest-worker proposal from 20011" helped to set the tone of
the Bush and Kerry campaigns and also to frame the most impor-
tant issues, controversies, and factors involved in the current
immigration reform debate.
156
A. Recognizing a Crucial Constituency
The population of Latin Americans in the United States has
reached thirty-five million, earning them the distinction of repre-
senting a "minority majority" as the nation's largest minority
group.5 During the 2004 presidential campaign season, both
President Bush and Senator Kerry recognized the importance of
appealing to Latin American voters by proposing immigration re-
151. CIS BACKGROUNDER, supra note 14, at 1.
152. Id. at 1, 13. China sent the second-highest number of immigrants, but its total
was still less than sixteen percent of Mexico's contribution. Id. at 13.
153. Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 52 (noting also that the number of illegal aliens
entering the United States in 2004 would be "enough to fill 22,000 Boeing 737-700 airlin-
ers").
154. See, e.g., Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 22, at Al (stating that Democrats and Re-
publicans are "courting immigrant constituencies" in swing states like Florida and New
Mexico); Ann M. Simmons, Immigration Is Topic A for Foreign-Born Voters, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2004, at A22 (explaining that Latin Americans represent thirty-two percent of
California's population and, as such, "immigration is a pertinent issue, both practically
and symbolically").
155. See Bush Remarks, supra note 150 ("Today, I ask the Congress to join me in pass-
ing new immigration laws that.., meet America's economic needs, and live up to our
highest ideals.").
156. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 22, at Al (arguing that the competing proposals of
the Democrats and the Republicans during the presidential campaigns helped "to define
the battle lines").
157. See Moreno Gonzales, supra note 20, at A04.
2005] 1377
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
form, since the crucial Hispanic swing vote brings a strong inter-
est in immigration issues.15 Although Latin Americans have tra-
ditionally voted for Democratic candidates, President Bush's po-
litical team has, since the 2000 campaign, made Latin American
voters a top priority. 5 9 Evidence of the President's success was an
enormous increase in the Republican share of the Latin American
vote in the 2000 election when compared to how Senator Dole
fared in 1996-thirty-five percent compared to twenty-one per-
cent.160 By early May 2004, it became apparent that President
Bush had benefited from a "head start" in announcing his immi-
gration reform plan in January, while Democrats did not present
their proposal until late spring.' 6 '
B. The Two Sides of the Controversy
While the Latin American voting base was certainly an impor-
tant target for both candidates, strong immigration views are
common among the rest of the American population as well. 62 On
a very basic level, two opposing "sides" of the public sentiment
spectrum can be discerned: the "anti-immigration" restrictionist
view, and the "pro-immigration" inclusiveness view.' 63 Granted,
this categorization is over simplified, but the following discussion
lists several popularly held concerns on both sides of the immi-
gration debate.
158. Id.
159. Ron Hutcheson & Dave Montgomery, Bush's Guest Worker Proposal: Firestorm
Engulfs Plan to Give Illegal Immigrants Legal Status: Foreigners Could Gain Entry to
U.S. by Holding Job, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.freep.
com/news/nw/immig_20040108.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
160. Moreno Gonzales, supra note 20, at A04.
161. Alonzo-Zaldivar, supra note 22, at Al (suggesting that the Democrats' immigra-
tion bill was "an effort to recapture a traditionally Democratic issue from President Bush,
who got out in front" by proposing his guest worker initiative several months earlier).
162. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1641 (noting the negative impact the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks had on public opinion regarding immigrants, particularly after the
economy soured and unemployment rates began to soar).
163. See Richbourg, supra note 2, at 477-78 (labeling optimistic, pro-immigration indi-
viduals as the 'Yin," and pessimistic, anti-immigration individuals as the 'Yang").
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1. The Anti-Immigration View
One of the most common anti-immigration complaints is the
claim that foreign-born immigrants, especially those entering the
United States illegally, are taking American jobs and displacing
American workers."6 One study performed in the early 1990s
predicted that the cost of job displacement by illegal aliens would
reach approximately $171.5 billion between 1993 and 2002.165 A
more recent study found that, between 2000 and mid-2003, em-
ployment of native-born Americans and established, legal immi-
grants fell by at least 900,000, while new illegal immigrants "sub-
stantially increased their access to jobs in the U.S. 166
Immigration opponents also point to the statistic that between
forty and fifty percent of wage loss among low-skilled American
workers is likely caused by illegal immigration.
167
Another major complaint is that illegal immigration results in
a massive drain on the United States economy and taxpayer
funds, most notably in states with high immigrant populations,
like California, Texas, Florida, and Arizona. 68 One of the best ar-
ticulations of this concern took the form of the grassroots-
sponsored "Proposition 187" in California, a 1994 ballot initiative
that was proposed by Californians frustrated with illegal aliens
benefiting from public assistance funds.'69 Passing with over-
whelming support, Proposition 187 eliminated many state-
provided benefits for illegal immigrants, such as welfare, non-
emergency healthcare, and the right to public elementary and
high school education. 170 Despite any ameliorative effects of
Proposition 187, the complaints in California continue: a 2004
study reported that California taxpayers are spending $7.7 billion
164. AILA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 1; Turoff, supra note 18, at 183-84; An-
drew M. Sum & Paul E. Harrington, Rise of the Off.the-Books Workforce, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2004, at M1 ("There has been substantial displacement of native-born workers by new
immigrants, especially in entry-level jobs.").
165. Turoff, supra note 18, 184 n.40.
166. Sum & Harrington, supra note 164, at M1 (observing that many native-born teen-
agers and adults without college degrees are being displaced by new, illegal immigrants).
167. See Cliff Stearns, Editorial, Don't Decriminalize Illegal Immigration, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 2004, at A13.
168. AILA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 2; Turoff, supra note 18, at 183 (stating
that "[tihis concern was plausible given evidence showing that illegal aliens ha[vel exacted
a high economic toll within the U.S.").
169. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1625.
170. Id.
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annually on public education benefits for illegal aliens and $1.4
billion annually on costs associated with the incarceration of ille-
gal aliens.'71
Finally, American residents of border towns through which
thousands of illegal aliens pass daily experience the most direct
adverse impacts of illegal immigration and are generally the most
outspoken critics.172 For example, in Bisbee, Arizona, located five
miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, residents complain about be-
ing overwhelmed by the constant flow of illegal immigrants
through their town-approximately three hundred each night.'73
Complaints from Bisbee residents typically relate to crime,174 nui-
sance, 175 and the reckless behavior of many illegal immigrants. 176
Also, similar to the concerns often voiced in California, the influx
of illegal immigrants in Bisbee has strained the tiny town's econ-
omy, unfairly forcing the local government to provide emergency
healthcare to illegal immigrants free-of-charge. 77 The types of
anti-immigration sentiments felt in Bisbee are also common in
other border towns. 178
171. FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE COSTS OF ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION TO CALIFORNIANS 1 (Nov. 2004), at http://www.fairus.orgFiles/OpenFile.
cfm?id=2571 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
172. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 51-57.
173. Id. at 51, 54.
174. Id. at 53-56 (explaining that some illegal immigrants have poisoned the residents'
dogs to prevent them from barking and will often steal vehicles, which resulted in Arizona
being the number one state in cars stolen per capita each year).
175. Id. at 53-54 (noting that illegal immigrants are very noisy at night and that they
will "turn the land into a vast latrine, leaving behind revolting mounds of personal refuse"
and garbage).
176. Id. at 54 (describing how illegal immigrants cut through fences, which causes hun-
dreds of cattle to stray from farms).
177. Id. at 55 (observing how Congress requires a fourteen-bed local hospital to provide
emergency care to illegal immigrants-often suffering from dehydration or injuries re-
ceived during high-speed chases with police-without reimbursing the $450,000 annual
expense).
178. See, e.g., A Citizens' Revolt, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2004, at 18A ("Weary Arizonans,
especially ranchers, who have had their properties overrun by illegal border crossers, have
been complaining for years."); Gil Klein, Dying to Cross: A Special Report from the Mexican
Border-Illegal Immigrants Who Circumvent Tough Barriers Often Pay with Their Lives,
RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2003, at Al (listing the complaints of residents in several
Texas, California, and Arizona towns).
1380 [Vol. 39:1355
REFORMING U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
2. The Pro-Immigration View
Most proponents view modern immigration as a necessary and
appropriate affirmation of the ideals on which the United States
was founded-inclusiveness, opportunities for self-made success
in the form of the "American Dream," and the notion that diver-
sity is the greatest asset to this nation's unique identity in the
world.179 They argue that immigrants come to the United States
with a desire to assimilate, learn English, and most importantly,
improve the lives of their families."' 0 A desire to freeload off of
public assistance funding is not a common motivation.' 8 ' Funda-
mentally, in response to anti-immigration sentiment, proponents
highlight the irony of attempting to close the United States's bor-
ders to immigration when one in five residents of this country is
an immigrant or has at least one immigrant parent.'82
Immigration proponents attack the job displacement statistics,
contrarily arguing that immigrants actually help create new
jobs.'83 As the logic goes and economists have argued, immigrants
expand the demand for goods and services by becoming consum-
ers themselves.'84 Also, immigrants frequently "fill vital niches in
the low and high skilled ends of the labor market, thus creating
subsidiary job opportunities for Americans."185 Rebutting the job
displacement statistics, immigration proponents stress the unre-
liable nature of the statistical methods used by immigration op-
ponents, and they refer to different studies that suggest job crea-
tion by illegal immigrants.186
Responding to arguments that illegal immigration drains the
domestic economy, immigration proponents argue that immi-
179. See Richbourg, supra note 2, at 477-78 (opining that immigration proponents "op-
erate out of a perspective of plenty.... [and] contend that there is more than enough to go
around").
180. AILA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 4.
181. Id.
182. See Cragg Hines, Editorial, Some Mean to Give Thanks for Drawbridge They'd
Raise; Cragg Hines Believes that Fear-Far More than Facts-Is Driving a Resurgence of
the Vindictive Anti-Immigration Movement, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2004, at B9 ("Some of
the biggest advocates of pulling up the drawbridge come from groups that have crossed it
most recently.").
183. AILABACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Turoff, supra note 18, at 184 n.41.
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grants-both legal and illegal-are significant sources of tax
revenue." 7 Apart from individuals being paid "under the table"
and those who are exempt due to their level of earnings, "all indi-
viduals who work in the United States are required to pay federal
income taxes."1 8 ' Economists found that immigrant households
paid an estimated $133 billion in direct federal, state, and local
taxes in 1997, and in New York, for example, the taxes paid by
immigrants were roughly proportional to their size in that state's
population.8 9 Overall, immigration proponents claim that most
Americans benefit from a healthier economy because of the
strengthened labor force and lower prices resulting from immi-
gration. 9 °
C. Differing Approaches to Reform: The Bush and Kerry
Campaign Stances
1. President Bush's Temporary Guest-Worker Proposal
President Bush described his reform plan as being designed to
"reflectU the American Dream" while also "serv[ing] the economic
needs of our country" and "help[ing] [to] return order and fairness
to our immigration system." '191 In essence, President Bush's plan
would offer temporary legal status to millions of undocumented
workers currently employed in the United States and also to
workers who are not currently in the United States but have job
offers waiting for them.' 92 The guest-worker status would last for
three years with an option for renewal, though only for a finite
period of time.193 This proposal would not offer amnesty to cur-
rently undocumented workers, nor would it place temporary
workers on any better path to citizenship than they would have if
they were not in the guest-worker program. 94 President Bush
187. AILA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2-3.
190. Id. at 3.
191. Bush Remarks, supra note 150 (describing the main components of President
Bush's proposed program).
192. Id.
193. Id. ("The legal status granted by this program will last three years and will be re-
newable-but it will have an end.").
194. See id; see also Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1646 ("Under the Bush plan, temporary
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emphasized the expectation that guest workers would return
permanently to their native countries after the expiration of their
temporary status. 195
2. The Democrats' Approach: A "Path to Citizenship"
The Democrats' modified guest-worker plan, endorsed by Sena-
tor Kerry while campaigning and continuing to be advocated in
the 109th Congress, "would offer green cards and permanent resi-
dent status to all immigrants who have been in the United States
at least five years, can prove they have worked for at least 24
months and have passed background and medical checks."196 The
proposal would also promote family reunification by loosening the
quotas currently preventing many immigrants from bringing
their relatives to the United States.'97 Although this program
would make it more difficult to "import" guest workers by limiting
their future entry to 350,000 annually, it would also "open the
path to citizenship for illegal immigrants already in the coun-
try."9 ' Differing sharply from President Bush's plan, the Democ-
rats' proposal would facilitate 'earned legalization"'-a form of
amnesty for illegal immigrants with proven and stable track re-
cords of employment, health, and law-abiding behavior.'99
D. Post-Election: President Bush's Guest-Worker Push Continues
Improving upon the gains Republicans made in the 2000 elec-
tion, President Bush received a notable forty-four percent of the
Latin American vote in the November 2004 election-nine per-
cent more than in 2000.200 President Bush's re-election and in-
workers will have to apply for green cards and citizenship under existing laws, with no
advantage over other applicants.").
195. Bush Remarks, supra note 150. ("This program expects temporary workers to re-
turn permanently to their home countries after their period of work in the United States
has expired.").




200. Paul S. Egan, Post-Election Analysis: What's in the Cards for Immigration Re-
form?, Federation for American Immigration Reform, at http://www.fairus.orgfLegislation/
Legislation.cfm?ID=2563&c=66 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Post-Election Analy-
sis].
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creased share of the Latin American vote should not, however, be
automatically interpreted to indicate that a majority of Ameri-
cans preferred his immigration reform proposal to the one Sena-
tor Kerry endorsed and Democrats are still promoting.2"' Al-
though immigration reform was a significant issue, exit polling,
though flawed, revealed that the chief concerns of the voting pub-
lic were, in descending order, moral and cultural values, the econ-
omy, the war on terrorism, the war in Iraq, and health and edu-
cation.2 °2 Moreover, Americans might not have been willing to
base their vote on immigration grounds due to skepticism of
President Bush's commitment to immigration reform in light of
the initial vagueness of his proposal 0 3 and his Administration's
unwillingness to support other proposed immigration bills.20 4
Nevertheless, regardless of the actual impact the immigration re-
form issue had on voters, the Bush Administration's actions im-
mediately following the President's re-election dispelled much of
the speculation that his proposal had been rhetoric-filled cam-
paign fuel.20 5 Since the election, President Bush has persisted in
actively promoting his guest-worker proposal, all but guarantee-
201. See id. ("The most immediate danger facing the immigration reform movement is
the politically mistaken view that the president's reelection [sic] is a mandate for open
borders, guest worker programs .... continued failure to enforce laws against illegal im-
migration or continued mass legal immigration.").
202. Id. While immigration is intertwined with each of these issues, it is simply not
possible to determine with certainty the extent to which immigration reform influenced
voters' election preferences. See id. (arguing that the Latin American votes could be inter-
preted to mean that fifty-six percent of Latin American voters cast their ballots against
Bush, preferring Kerry's amnesty/family reunification proposal, or that forty-four percent
of Latin Americans cast their ballots against Kerry, fearing that his limitations on the
number of guest-worker entries could "jeopardize their own economic security"); see also
Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1639 (explaining that immigrant advocacy groups were fairly
mixed in their views on immigration reforms, but most Mexican workers prefer a plan that
could ultimately lead to citizenship).
203. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 22, at Al ("The Democratic proposal contains
more detail than Bush's principles for immigration reform."); Bush Remarks, supra note
150 (outlining proposed principles for reform with few concrete details).
204. See Patricia Medige, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant
Guestworker Proposal: Immigrant Labor Issues, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 735. 737
(2004) (listing several sources of "doubt[] that the President [was] serious about immigra-
tion reform").
205. Post-Election Analysis, supra note 200 ("Already, less than a week after the elec-
tion, the president's men are again pressing for an amnesty/guestworker program."); See
also e.g., Medige, supra note 204, at 735 (noting that some commentators had speculated
that President Bush's proposal was an "election-year ploy") (quoting Hutcheson & Mont-
gomery, supra note 159); John Conyers, Jr. & Sheila Jackson Lee, "Harvest of Shame"
Again?, LEGAL TiMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at 54 (expressing skepticism over the Bush Admini-
stration's "election-year conversion to immigration reform").
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ing a prolonged immigration reform debate continuing well into
the 109th session of Congress and possibly beyond." 6
1. The Mexican Government: An Ardent Supporter of
Immigration Reform
President Fox and the Mexican government have enthusiasti-
cally backed President Bush's guest-worker proposal, and their
motivation is clear: Mexico has an enormous stake in the outcome
of the American immigration debate.20 7 The Mexican economy re-
ceives more money from its citizens working in the United States
who send their earnings back home than it does from the entire
Mexican tourism industry.208 Money sent home from Mexican
immigrants in the United States ranks second only to petroleum
exports for Mexico's foreign revenue.20 9 With Mexican unemploy-
ment rates soaring, President Fox has "lauded as heroes" both le-
gal and illegal immigrants working in the United States, because
he views their efforts as tremendously beneficial to Mexico.210
With a United States-Mexican immigration agreement as his "top
foreign policy priority," President Fox views the Bush Admini-
stration's guest-worker program as a way to meet his objectives,
and he considers the re-election of President Bush as an indicator
that the President's proposal will be approved.21
In addition to wanting to bolster Mexico's economy, President
Fox also has a considerable personal stake in the outcome of the
immigration reform debate." ' In light of the rising fatality statis-
tics of Mexicans attempting to cross into the United States ille-
206. See Post-Election Analysis, supra note 200 (offering a post-election prediction that
"[clongressional leaders will be pressed hard by the White House in the months ahead" to
adopt the President's proposal).
207. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 53 (noting that money sent back to Mexico
from Mexicans working in the United States provided the Mexican economy with $13 bil-
lion in revenue in 2003).
208. See Pat Doyle, Cash Flow to Mexico Is a Focus for Fox; Money from Immigrants
Can Be Lifeline for Families, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 18, 2004, at 1A.
209. Id.; see Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 53.
210. See Doyle, supra, note 208, at 1A; see also infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing economic
disparities between Latin American countries and the United States).
211. Glenn Kessler & Kevin Sullivan, Powell Cautious About Immigration Changes;
Bush Will Give Plan 'High Priority,' Mexicans Told, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at A16.
212. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; see also Hugh Dellios, Mexico Pushes
U.S. on Immigration; Fox Seeks Reforms that Bush Touted, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2004, at C3.
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gally,213 Mexican opposition leaders and church officials have
been pressuring President Fox to ensure that immigration be-
comes safer and easier.214 With the 2006 Mexican presidential
election not too far off, President Fox feels a sense of urgency to
accomplish immigration reform by late 2005 in order to success-
fully seek re-election. 21 ' Evidence of President Fox's diligence is
his recent support for the issuance of Mexican consular identity
cards to illegal aliens living in the United States.2 6 The consular
cards have been approved by many state and local governments,
enabling illegal aliens to open savings or checking accounts, ob-
tain driver's licenses, and perform other tasks that would nor-
mally require official United States identification documents,
such as a valid Social Security card.217
Just one week after President Bush's re-election, Secretary of
State Colin Powell and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
met with President Fox in Mexico at the United States-Mexico
Binational Commission meeting.218 Secretary of State Powell em-
phasized that President Bush would be placing a "high priority"
on promoting his plan to Congress, but he cautiously added that
he did not want to "overpromise" success.21 9 Shortly thereafter,
President Bush spoke with the Mexican President at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Summit in Chile.22° After
explaining to President Fox that he had "campaigned on [the im-
migration reform] issue," President Bush reiterated his desire to
develop "reasonable immigration policies" that would ensure a se-
cure border and "respect and dignity" for Mexican immigrants,
213. See Hugh Dellios, Immigration Change a Priority, Powell Tells Mexico, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 10, 2004, at C6 ("In recent years, an average of at least one Mexican per day has died
along the countries 2,000-mile frontier. Most have drowned in the Rio Grande or perished
in the heat of Arizona's desert.").
214. Dellios, supra note 212, at C3.
215. See id.
216. See Doyle, supra note 208, at 1A (detailing President Fox's June 2004 visit with
Minneapolis-St. Paul banking leaders to discuss ways to transfer money to Mexico more
efficiently and to lobby them to accept the consular identification cards at their banks).
217. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1644-45 & n.408.
218. Kessler & Sullivan, supra note 211, at A16.
219. Id. (stating that "Secretary of State Colin L. Powell gave Mexican officials a 'sober
report' . . . on the prospects of winning congressional approval" to enact President Bush's
proposal in its current form).
220. Press Release, The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by Presi-
dent Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico After Bilateral Meeting (Nov. 21, 2004), at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/38605.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Bush-Fox
Press Release].
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though he did not specify how he would present the reform to a
Congress that resisted his proposal throughout 2004.221
2. The Formidable Congressional Hurdle
a. Democrats' View: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing
At face value, President Bush's newfound zeal for immigration
reform might seem rather odd, since immigration has tradition-
ally been an issue pushed mainly by Democrats.222 Vehemently
opposing President Bush's proposal, however, Democrats are
quick to point out the underlying purpose and likely consequences
of the Bush Administration's plan.223 Democrats stress the "noto-
rious" history of guest-worker programs in the United States with
particular emphasis on the Bracero Program of the mid-twentieth
century.224 They consider the Bracero Program as having exposed
thousands of Mexican workers to abusive and exploitative em-
ployment, essentially allowing immigrants to be used, abused,
and then deported.225 The Bush proposal, they argue, would simi-
larly "relegate millions of foreigners to permanent underclass
status" by tying their legal status to a specific employer, thereby
giving employers an incentive to exploit and immigrants a disin-
centive to complain.226 Moreover, Democrats have questioned the
practicality of a program expecting millions of currently undocu-
mented immigrants to come forward and declare themselves ille-
gal knowing they face deportation as soon as their temporary vi-
221. Id.
222. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 22, at Al ("The Democrats have been working on
immigration for quite a while, and they cannot afford to have the president one-up them
on it.") (quoting Demetrios Papademetrion, President of the Migration Policy Institute)).
223. Conyers & Jackson Lee, supra note 205, at 54 (referring to President Bush's plan
as "a wolf in sheep's clothing offered by a party that has consistently opposed immigrants'
rights"); see also Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1575 n.25 (citing several articles criticizing
President Bush's plan).
224. Conyers & Jackson Lee, supra note 205, at 54; see also Medige, supra note 204, at
735 (describing the likely result of implementing the President's plan as being "a new era
of indentured servants") (quoting Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc., The President's Tempo-
rary Foreign Worker Proposal Is Ill-Conceived, at http://www.fwjustice.org/bush-policy.
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005)). See generally Alvarado, supra note 101 (arguing for the
rejection of a guest-worker program by explaining the injustice and exploitation inherent
in the Bracero Program).
225. See Conyers & Jackson Lee, supra note 205, at 54.
226. See id.
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sas have expired.227 Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, the rank-
ing member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion, Border Security and Claims, has made the Democrats' posi-
tion quite clear: "The guest-worker program proposed by
President Vincente Fox and this administration will not work. 228
b. Republicans' Skepticism: Rewarding Illegality with Amnesty?
Opposition to President Bush's proposal has not been limited to
Democrats. In fact, "Republican lawmakers have been among the
biggest skeptics of Bush's plan."229 The main concern voiced by
conservatives has been over what Republicans perceive as an
amnesty component to the President's plan, effectively rewarding
illegal aliens for their unlawful presence in the United States.230
Given that President Bush's proposal "received a lukewarm re-
ception on Capitol Hill"231 in 2004 and continues to be opposed in
early 2005 by many Democrats and Republicans, the President's
plan, and immigration reform overall, "face[] a difficult road
through Congress."232
227. See id.
228. 150 CONG. REC. H9860 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee)
(emphasis added). "You will not get 8 million illegal immigrants in this country to accept
[this proposal's] philosophy. Nor will [we have] a secure America, because we are not fo-
cusing on securing our borders. We are focusing on what I think is misdirected in a tempo-
rary guest worker program." Id. Representative Jackson Lee has further opined: "Despite
an egregious history of failed temporary foreign worker programs in the United States
that have hurt immigrant and domestic workers alike, the President proposes a... vastly
enlarged temporary worker program that will do nothing to strengthen protections for
wages, benefits and other rights of immigrant and domestic workers." 150 CONG. REC.
H422 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
229. Kessler & Sullivan, supra note 211, at A16; see also Jacoby, supra note 101, at
1647 (stating that the President's proposal "has met notable opposition on both ends of the
political spectrum"); Wayne Washington, Bush Upsets Part of Conservative Base, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2004, at Al ("The immigration proposal is the latest in a series of Bush po-
licies that have angered parts of the president's conservative political base.").
230. See Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1647; David D. Kirkpatrick, House Passes Tighten-
ing of Laws on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A13 (quoting Republican Sena-
tor Trent Lott as stating that "[tihe president's guest worker program is not going any-
where, period .... [and] [hie needs to go ahead and accept it. We are not going to do
anything that looks like, smells like or in anyway resembles amnesty, period.'"); see also
Frank del Olmo, Immigration Reforms Border on a Good Proposal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2004, at M5 ("Some of Bush's [Republican] critics are using the word 'amnesty' to refer to
any step, however modest, that gives illegal immigrants some legal status .....
231. Kessler & Sullivan, supra note 211, at A16.
232. Dellios, supra note 213, at C6; see also del Olmo, supra note 230, at M5 (predicting
a long delay for immigration reform in Congress given the "complex and contentious" na-
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IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REALITY-BASED OPTIONS
FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM
A. The Inevitability of Latin American Immigration
As the current debate on immigration reform churns in the
109th Congress, it is important to note that no federal lawmaker
proposes a ban on Latin American immigration. Completely clos-
ing America's doors to immigrants would be a grossly unnatural,
anachronistic, and impractical policy that would flatly contradict
this nation's founding principles.233 Aside from certain restrictive,
but justifiable,234 policies related to modern terrorism concerns,
the United States seems to have evolved out of the restrictionist
mentality that began to take legislative form in the 1880s and
continued through the McCarthyism phase of the mid-twentieth
century. 5 Any discussions concerning immigration reform must
operate on one common premise: As the world continues to evolve
into the twenty-first century, Latin American immigration into
the United States is simply inevitable.236 Taking into account sev-
eral considerations makes the inevitability of Latin American
immigration unequivocally apparent.
ture of the debates so far). It should be noted, however, that while President Bush's main
immigration reform bill has yet to receive congressional approval in the 109th Congress,
some congressional immigration initiatives have been passed by the House and/or the
Senate. For example, the REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (2005) was ap-
proved by the House on February 10, 2005. 151 CONG. REC. H566 (2005). Section 202 of
the Act prevents states from issuing standard drivers' licenses to illegal immigrants).
233. See Schuck, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that restrictive nationalism in immigra-
tion policy is inconsistent with contemporary public law values and ever-popular "commu-
nitarian" values).
234. But see Don Phillips, Airlines' Representative Deplores Security 'Mess,' INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 10, 2004, at 2 (articulating the arguments of some international busi-
nessmen and government officials that unreasonable and improperly administered airport
security policies must be changed, especially in light of the recent detention of singer Yu-
suf Islam (formerly "Cat Stevens")).
235. See Schuck, supra note 7, at 3-5.
236. See Andrew Scott Kosegi, Note: The H-2A Program: How the Weight of Agricul-
tural Employer Subsidies Is Breaking the Backs of Domestic Migrant Farm Workers, 35
IND. L. REV. 269, 299 (2001) ("[Illegal immigration to the United States seems to be inevi-
table . . ").
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1. Historical Identity as a Nation of Immigrants
The United States has long been recognized worldwide as a di-
verse nation of immigrants.237 Many scholars feel that signifi-
cantly restricting immigration from Latin America would be
wholly incompatible with the United States's image of having
open arms to foreigners in search of better lives.23 Of particular
importance is the long history of Mexican guest-worker programs,
which first took form in this country around the time of World
War I and were again introduced during World War II.239 While
intended to function as a war-time solution for a labor shortage,
the Bracero Program lasted more than twenty years.240 Having
started families here, however, many Mexican Braceros remained
in the United States after the program ended, which planted the
seeds for what would become the United States's largest minority
group at the beginning of the twenty-first century.241 Latin
American immigration continues to build and reunite families,
adding to an expansive social network of immigrant families that
has moved far beyond just the border states.242 Attempting to sig-
nificantly reduce the flow of Latin American immigrants into the
United States would be unfaithful to this nation's historical iden-
tity, and it would also prove impossible when one considers how
intensely motivated some Latin Americans are to reunite with
family members living in the United States.243
237. E.g., Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domes-
tic Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 986 (2002)
(stating the view of some commentators of the inevitability of "pro-immigrant... poli-
cies ... in a nation of immigrants that is committed to human rights and, in particular, to
political and religious freedom").
238. See Erin Kragh, Book Note, Forging a Common Culture: Integrating California's
Illegal Immigrant Population, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 373, 381 (2004) (reviewing
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, MEXIFORNIA: A STATE OF BECOMING (2003)) ("[A policy restricting
Latin American immigration would] be difficult to implement because of its incompatibil-
ity with America's historical identity as a nation of immigrants.").
239. See supra notes 82-86, 101-03 and accompanying text.
240. See Alvarado, supra note 101, at 59.
241. See id. at 56.
242. See CIS BACKGROUNDER, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that Georgia, North Caro-
lina, New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania-all nonborder states-experienced very
large increases in their immigrant populations since 2000); see also Spotts, supra note 119,
at 617 (explaining that "the strong ties between Mexican citizens and family members in
the United States ... create social networks that 'pull' migrants from Mexico").
243. See, e.g., Mary Jordan, A Harsh Price to Pay in Pursuit of a Dream; For Central
American Women, Sexual Coercion Is Hazard on Route to U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2004,
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2. Poverty, Lack of Opportunity, and Encouragement of Illegal
Immigration on the Other Side of the Border
Economic disparities between Latin American countries and
the United States create strong reasons for immigrants to em-
bark on dangerous journeys into the United States.244 "[P]oor liv-
ing conditions, high levels of unemployment, poverty, political
unrest, overcrowding, and government oppression" plague many
Latin American countries and are "push" factors that fuel both
legal and illegal immigration into the United States.245 Of par-
ticular significance is the way in which many Latin American po-
litical leaders either passively condone or actively encourage their
citizens to illegally migrate into the United States.246 President
Fox of Mexico, for example, has denied the illegality of his citi-
zens' migration into the United States, emphatically pointing out
that immigrants are beneficial to the American economy, want to
work productively, and are only searching for better opportuni-
ties.247 In early January 2005, supported by President Fox, Mex-
ico's Foreign Relations Department boldly published nearly two
million pocket-size books titled the "Guide for the Mexican Immi-
grant."24" The book, replete with color illustrations and detailed
instructions, has been distributed free of charge and provides
Mexican citizens with survival tips should they choose to cross
into the United States illegally.249
at A01 (describing a Honduran woman's dangerous journey in Central America in an ef-
fort to reunite with her brother in Miami, Florida); Nation/ World: Guatemala: Several Are
Arrested in Child Smuggling Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 2002, at A7 (describ-
ing a situation where Latin American parents paid over $5,000 to smuggle each of their
children into the United States).
244. See Spotts, supra note 119, at 617.
245. Id. at 602.
246. See Turoff, supra note 18, at 203-10 (describing the Mexican government's ap-
proval and encouragement of migration into the United States, which they refuse to ac-
knowledge as "illegal").
247. Id. at 204-05 ("'They are not illegals. They are not illegals. They are people that
come there [to the U.S.] to work, to look for a better opportunity in life ....." (quoting
President Fox from a March 2002 television interview)).
248. Oscar Avila, Illegal-Immigration Tips from Mexico Stir Rancor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9,
2005, at C1.
249. Id. The book, for example, informs immigrants of the risks involved with water
crossings and recommends following "light poles, railroad tracks, or dirt roads" should one
become lost in the desert. Id. For illegal immigrants already in the United States, the book
suggests "avoid[ing] noisy parties," because the police could be called and would likely ar-
rest undocumented Mexicans in attendance. Id.
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The perception in many Latin American countries of the ability
of illegal aliens to readily find "better jobs, education, political
stability, and improved health and welfare benefits" in the United
States motivates millions of Latin Americans annually to try to
illegally enter the United States.25 0 Newspapers in the United
States are filled with tear-jerking articles detailing the risks,
hardships, and sacrifices involved in many Latin American immi-
grants' attempts at traveling into the United States.251 If Latin
Americans are willing to turn over their life's savings and risk
death for a chance to live in the United States, common sense dic-
tates that Latin American immigration, even if restricted, is sure
to persist "as long as economic conditions in nearby countries con-
tinue to languish."2" '
3. Reaping the Benefits of Immigrant Labor
Critics of immigration frequently overlook the fact that the
costs of many goods and services are much lower for American
consumers as a direct result of lower-wage immigrant labor.
253
Also, critics often harp on job displacement, failing to acknowl-
edge one important fact: The reason employers hire illegal immi-
grants is because many Americans are no longer willing to per-
form the type of work for which most illegal immigrants are
employed.254 In response to this observation, some economists ar-
250. See Spotts, supra note 119, at 602.
251. See, e.g., Angel Gonzdlez, Truckers May Face Federal Charges; 30 Illegal Immi-
grants Found in Trailer Now at Euless Detention Center, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 20,
2004, at 10B (describing how thirty illegal Latin American immigrants were arrested after
being found, severely overheated, in the back of a smuggler's trailer in Texas, having paid
to be smuggled into the United States); Jordan, supra note 243, at A01 (telling the story of
Ileana, a twenty-year-old Honduran woman who handed over her family's life savings to a
smuggler only to be apprehended in Mexico and forced into a life of prostitution).
252. See Kosegi, supra note 236, at 299; see also Bollerup, supra note 150, at 1044
(opining that no number of Border Patrol officials would be sufficient to stop the steady
flow "of illegal workers who are seeking a better life").
253. Guillermo I. Martinez, A Feel-Good Substitute, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),
at 19A; see also Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 57 ("[M]any citizens quietly benefit
from the flood of illegals because the supply of cheap labor helps keep down the cost of
many goods and services, from chicken parts to lawn care.").
254. See Regina Germain, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant
Guestworker Proposal: The Time for Immigration Reform Is Now, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'y 747, 748 (2004) ("Our nation would grind to a halt without immigrants willing to...
[perform agricultural work][,] the least desirable jobs in our society."); Jacoby, supra note
101, at 1614-16 ("Because U.S. workers are increasingly unable or unwilling to fill the
growing number of low-skilled positions, U.S. companies rely on immigrant labor to accept
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gue that American workers would be willing to accept immigrant-
filled jobs if they were paid higher wages.25 That rebuttal, how-
ever, ignores the likelihood that, rather than give the jobs to
Americans at a higher wage rate, many American companies
would outsource the work to another country.25 6
4. Immigration Analogized to Outsourcing
Another consideration suggesting the future survival and in-
crease in Latin American immigration is drawn from analogizing
immigration to outsourcing. Like immigration, outsourcing in-
volves the controversial practice of American employers offering
jobs to foreigners, though, with outsourcing, the foreigners typi-
cally perform the work in their native countries. 257 Despite the
controversy, however, members of the Bush Administration have
defended the practice of outsourcing as "a natural effect of the
global economic system" that benefits the United States. 258 Simi-
larly, one could argue that, as Latin American immigration con-
tinues to swell in the United States, embracing this trend would
"increase national and global economic welfare because of more
efficient use of the untapped source of relatively low-wage la-
bor. '259 It is, therefore, reasonable to view immigration as mutu-
ally beneficial-an inevitable byproduct of the desire for economic
efficiency in the United States that also benefits foreign workers
looking for a quality of life superior to what they had in their na-
tive country. 26° As such, immigration reform efforts should be
aimed at accommodating and integrating foreign workers into the
these jobs."); Martinez, supra note 253, at 19A ("American workers no longer like to work
at back-breaking farm jobs....").
255. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1614.
256. Id. at 1614-15.
257. See Jyoti Thottam et al., Is Your Job Going Abroad?, TIME, March 1, 2004, at 27.
258. Steven R. Weisman, Powell Reassures India on Technology Jobs but Presses for
Opening of Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at A6 (quoting Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell).
259. Johnson, supra note 10, at 235. See generally id. at 235-36 (analogizing immigra-
tion to the proliferation of international trade and arguing for the benefits of a liberalized
immigration policy).
260. See id. at 233-34 (describing the "concrete benefits" of immigrant labor for the
United States economy, as well as the higher standard of living sought by foreign-born
immigrants when coming to the United States).
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United States economy, rather than trying to preclude the phe-
nomenon or allow it only on a temporary basis.
261
B. Realistic Options for Immigration Reform
1. Mexico: Confronting the, Issue, at its Core
Reforming the laws of the United States is necessary to develop
a more sound United States-Mexican immigration policy, but
Mexico is in equal need of reform if the illegal immigration issue
is going to be properly addressed.262 In 2003, the Mexican unem-
ployment rate rose faster than it had in the previous ten years.
2 63
Mexicans who are unemployed have to make due with wages
"kept low by the Mexican government to attract foreign busi-
nesses looking to decrease their operating costs."21 Making mat-
ters worse, in November 2004, the Mexican inflation rate acceler-
ated at its fastest pace in nearly three years.265 It is no wonder
that more illegal Mexican immigrants are crossing into the
United States than ever before.266 One Mexican woman summa-
rized the situation well: "If our own government can't support us,
how can we expect our neighbor to support us? The problem starts
in Mexico."267
President Fox recently emphasized his commitment to create
jobs in Mexico to help address the illegal immigration problem
from Mexico's side of the border,26 but one has to question the
sincerity of his commitment to solving a "problem" that he has
publicly deemed to not be a problem.269 Mexican leaders must
261. See id. at 258.
262. See Stearns, supra note 167, at A13.
263. Latin America: Mexico Jobless Rate Has Biggest Rise in Almost Decade,
Bloomberg.com (Jan. 21, 2004), at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&
sid=aFyPw.JnOUng&refer=latin-america (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
264. Jenna L. Acuff, Note, The Race to the Bottom: The United States' Influence on
Mexican Labor Law Enforcement, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 387, 405 (2004).
265. See Interest Rates Up; Stocks Set Record, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 11, 2004 at B4.
266. See Germain, supra note 254, at 749.
267. LoBregilo, supra note 118, at 960 (quoting from a telephone interview with "Marta
C") (emphasis added).
268. See Bush-Fox Press Release, supra note 220 (describing President Fox's comments
at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Summit in November 2004).
269. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (quoting President Fox in a March
2002 television interview during which he seemed indignant at the notion that Mexicans
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take economic reform seriously, and the United States should ac-
tively assist the Mexican government in promoting economic
growth. Logically, reducing the incentive for Mexicans to leave
their country will assuage some of the concerns over illegal immi-
gration in the United States.
In the meantime, the Mexican government can and must im-
prove its efforts to crack down on human smuggling through Mex-
ico and into the United States. After the IIRIRA was enacted in
1996, the United States Border Patrol's funding was significantly
increased, which enabled them to improve their enforcement ef-
forts.27 ° One of the main consequences for Mexican immigrants
was an increased reliance on expensive smugglers to take them
into the United States.27' Some commentators argue that the in-
creased smuggling costs have resulted in considerably larger
numbers of illegal aliens remaining in the United States for
longer periods of time out of fear that they would not be able to
afford re-entry if they were to leave.272 Although Mexican authori-
ties have been intercepting smugglers and detaining a record
number of migrants-often more than one thousand per day-
more work remains to be done.273
2. The United States: A More Sensible Approach to the Border
The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its na-
tional security, and heightened concerns over terrorism in recent
years are certainly justified. Since the September 11, 2001, at-
tacks, however, it has become increasingly apparent that the
Bush Administration views immigration through a "[national] se-
curity lens."274 In a November 2004 meeting with President Fox,
President Bush discussed immigration concerns within the larger
context of national security, emphasizing, in particular, border
working in the United States could be considered "illegal").
270. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1610.
271. Id.; see also id. at 1610 n.206 (citing numerous authorities indicating notable in-
creases in the percentage of Mexicans using human smugglers throughout the 1990s).
272. See id. at 1610-11.
273. Jordan, supra note 243, at A01.
274. Doris Meissner, Immigration in the Post 9-11 Era, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 851, 852
(2002). For example, what had been Immigration and Naturalization Services within the
Department of Justice became the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, part of
the Department of Homeland Security. See LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 940-41 (discuss-
ing several post-9/11 changes in immigration policy and enforcement).
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security.275 Having mentioned border security as the first basic
principle guiding his guest-worker program, President Bush ap-
pears to view increased border enforcement as one of the most ef-
fective ways to handle the United States's growing illegal immi-
grant problem. 6
Although secure borders are of supreme importance in protect-
ing the United States from terrorism, some argue that the United
States-Mexico border "poses little threat in terms of terrorism. "277
Furthermore, despite the Border Patrol's increased enforcement
powers, more illegal immigrants are entering the United States
now than ever before, and many of them are choosing to enter the
country through dangerous and highly remote areas. When
viewed in this light, the increased funding and renewed emphasis
on fortifying the United States-Mexico border seems slightly mis-
guided.2 79 After one considers that "the majority of people who en-
ter the United States illegally do so by overstaying legally ob-
tained.., visas," it would appear wise to divert some of the
increased funding for the Border Patrol to "more urgent" and nec-
essary immigration matters, such as visa enforcement efforts.280
Protecting national security and promoting reasonable immigra-
tion policies do not have to be mutually exclusive.
3. The Need for an Immigration Reform Plan Grounded in
Reality
President Bush's guest-worker plan will not be approved in its
current form. Democrats in Congress have sharply criticized the
275. Bush-Fox Press Release, supra note 220.
276. See Bush Remarks, supra note 150 (explaining that the Bush Administration has
"significantly expanded the Border Patrol," adding more than one-thousand new agents
and increasing funding by forty percent since 2002).
277. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1661; see also Meissner, supra note 274, at 858 (ex-
pressing the need for "far more focus" on the U.S.-Canada border than the U.S.-Mexico
border in the war on terrorism).
278. See Germain, supra note 254, at 749 (noting that approximately two thousand il-
legal migrants have died trying to cross over the U.S.-Mexico border since 1998); Jacoby,
supra note 101, at 1610.
279. See Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1661.
280. See id.; see also Spotts, supra note 119, at 617-18 (arguing that increasing the
funding and manpower of the Border Patrol will not deter potential migrants from ille-
gally entering, but reducing the economic disparities between the United States and Mex-
ico would work).
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proposal;21' many Republicans in Congress are "vehemently op-
pose[d]" to the idea;21 2 members of the Bush Administration ac-
knowledge that changes need to be made;23 and Mexicans remain
skeptical over its prospects for enactment.2 4
Having been thrust into the public eye and heavily debated in
Congress throughout 2004, however, the political climate is right
for a major immigration reform plan of some type to be seriously
considered and ultimately enacted.28 5
The Bush Administration has correctly recognized the need to
deal with illegal immigrants once they are already in the United
States, unlike so many other recent tunnel-vision initiatives de-
signed solely to keep illegal immigrants out.28 6 Unfortunately, the
cornerstone of the President's guest-worker program-the tempo-
rary three-year status to be conferred on immigrants-is funda-
mentally flawed. It is simply unreasonable to expect illegal Latin
American immigrants, already living comfortably in the United
States, to voluntarily participate in this program and effectively
set their own course for being deported after the expiration of
their newly acquired "temporary status."282 An option for a finite
renewal does little to make this proposal easier to swallow, since
the temporary status would still come to an end.
The limited three-year duration is equally troubling as applied
to Latin Americans who are not currently in the United States.
Paradoxically, President Bush believes that his proposal "reflects
the American Dream" by inviting guest workers into this country
for a limited duration, after which time they will be legally re-
281. See supra Part III.D.2.a.
282. Immigration Effort Is Resurrected, DENVER POST, Nov. 24, 2004, at B-06.
283. See Dellios, supra note 213, at C6 (quoting Secretary of State Powell as saying the
Bush Administration would be working with Congress "'to get this [guest worker program]
right'") (alteration in original).
284. See Kessler & Sullivan, supra note 211, at A16 (noting that many Mexicans "re-
main skeptical that the United States is serious about immigration reform" and quoting a
former Mexican ambassador to the United States as stating, "I don't think [Bush's guest-
worker plan] [is] something that people will swallow in the United States").
285. See LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 933 ("Today, there is a marked focus both in the
political arena and in general public discourse on the problems caused by illegal immigra-
tion from [Latin America].").
286. See id. at 942.
287. See 150 CONG. REC. H9860 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jackson
Lee) ("We can no longer have a temporary guest program... that allows people to come in
for 3 years and then suggest to them that they must then leave the country in order to...
remain in a position to possibly have another job again.").
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quired to return to their native countries.2"' The President's plan
does not embody or reflect the American Dream for guest work-
ers. At most, it reflects a fleeting taste of the American Dream-
temporary exposure to the wonderful rights and privileges
Americans enjoy followed by a mandate to surrender their new-
found quality of life and return to the economic disasters from
which they fled. That is not fair, nor is it a realistic incentive.
Another impracticality of the President's plan is the require-
ment that temporary work visas be tied to single employers. If
guest workers feel as though switching jobs is not an option, they
will come to view their employment as binding and will be more
reluctant to report exploitation or abuses for fear of losing their
status.8 9 Also, immigrants are frequently employed as day labor-
ers, construction workers, nannies, gardeners, and domestic
workers-positions that would be difficult to secure in advance
when not yet in the United States. As such, the President's re-
quirement that would-be immigrants have employment already
lined up before being admitted would have little success in prac-
tice. An immigration plan allowing workers more flexibility in
both arranging and, if necessary, changing employment options
without the fear of deportation would help to combat the abuse of
immigrant workers so common in the past.29°
With respect to American employers, the federal government
must improve their efforts to enforce immigration laws and im-
pose penalties on employers who choose not to comply.2 9' One of
the primary motivating factors for illegal immigration is the
common perception in Latin American countries that illegal im-
migrants will easily be able to find jobs with employers who bla-
tantly ignore documentation requirements for their workers.292
The government's nonenforcement of employer sanctions "has
been the equivalent of hanging out a HELP WANTED sign for il-
288. Bush Remarks, supra note 150.
289. See Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1647; Conyers & Jackson Lee, supra note 205, at 54
("Under Bush's program, immigrants' right to stay in the United States would again be
entirely contingent on getting and keeping a job with a U.S. employer. What is the guar-
antee that the abuses and exploitation of the past will not be repeated?").
290. See Medige, supra note 204, at 741.
291. See Bollerup, supra note 150, at 1042-44.
292. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 21, at 58 (describing a major incentive for illegal
immigration to be the message they perceive from American employers: '"If you can run
that border, we have a job for you'").
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legals."293 Communicating more clearly to employers about the
complex process of legal work authorization and the likely reper-
cussions of noncompliance is an essential element of a successful
immigration reform plan.294 If hiring violations do occur, employ-
ers must face stiff penalties that would "outweigh the benefit for
employers to hire cheap labor."29
Fundamentally, Latin American immigrants uproot themselves
and their families from their native countries in an effort to se-
cure a healthier, more stable way of life. Any successful immigra-
tion reform plan must, therefore, respect and facilitate immi-
grants' social and economic stability. The current version of the
Bush Administration's guest-worker program is nothing more
than a virtually guaranteed dead-end for immigrant workers.
President Bush has expressed his desire to increase the number
of green cards that could lead to citizenship, but he has failed to
provide any specifics.296 Casting doubt on the viability of the
President's goal is the substantial backlog of more than six mil-
lion immigrants waiting for their visa applications to be proc-
essed.297 A successful immigration reform initiative would specifi-
cally identify and provide for additional resources to assist the
Department of Homeland Security in screening and processing
more applications.29 A "path to citizenship" does not have to be
quick and direct, but it must, nevertheless, exist as an incentive
for both legal and illegal immigrants to participate in a guest-
worker program.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no perfect solution to the immigration controversy. As
long as any American citizen remains unemployed while an im-
migrant-legal or illegal-has a job, anti-immigration sentiments
will permeate in some segments of the American population. In-
293. Id.
294. See LoBreglio, supra note 118, at 962.
295. See Bollerup, supra note 150, at 1044 (arguing that an increase in penalties
should "target employers who knowingly hire illegal workers" and also those who aid in
the creation and use of fraudulent documents).
296. Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1646-47.
297. Conyers & Jackson Lee, supra note 205, at 54.
298. Id.
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creased immigration must, however, be accepted as inevitable
and necessary in the United States. Immigrants founded the
United States; they were vital contributors to the industrial and
manufacturing bases upon which this country rose to interna-
tional economic dominance; they have helped to mold the
uniquely diverse "American" identity; they are currently entering
this country at an unprecedented rate; and, as they build expan-
sive social networks across the country, immigrants will continue
to make the trek into the United States to reunite with their
families and find higher-paying jobs. There is considerable logic
inherent in accommodating the inevitable.299
The current era in immigration has been marked by an influx
of Latin American immigrants. Rather than view them as pariahs
who compete with and displace American workers, one should
take to heart the United States-government-certified statistic
that, between 2000 and 2010, more than thirty-three million new
job openings will be created in the United States that will require
little or moderate training. 00 These will be the types of jobs
viewed by Latin American immigrants as opportunities for a bet-
ter life, but considered by most Americans to be wholly undesir-
able. Immigration reform in the United States should aim to em-
brace willing and motivated immigrants, benefit from their labor,
and ultimately reward them with a realistic chance at citizen-
ship-not a one-way ticket back to their native countries. As the
sonnet goes, "[g]ive me your tired, your poor, your huddled
masses yearning to breathe free"3°--ignoring this theme would
be a slap in the face to Lady Liberty and the ultimate paradox
given the indispensable role of immigration throughout our na-
tion's history.
Ryan D. Frei
299. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 258 ("The sensible approach is to adopt laws and
policies that facilitate [changes brought on by increased immigration], rather than to seek
to prevent the inevitable.").
300. AILA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 19, at 2 (citing a study undertaken by the
United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics).
301. Lazarus, supra note 5.
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